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ABSTRACT
It is a known fact that foreign multinational firms hold significant ownership in firms listed on Bursa Malaysia. These 
foreign owners do not only provide capital, but also managerial expertise and exceptional monitoring mechanism on 
managers. Therefore, it can be expected that foreign ownership improves firm performance and efficiency. However, 
the extent to which their participation in ownership could improve firm performance particularly in emerging countries 
such as Malaysia has to be empirically tested. This study investigates the relationship between foreign ownership and 
firm performance of public listed firms in Malaysia. Three years panel data of 730 Malaysian public listed firms were 
examined. The results show that foreign ownership has positive and significant relationship with ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
Therefore, the involvement of foreign investors in monitoring and controlling activities reduces agency conflict in the 
emerging economy. This is the first study that utilizes the extended agency theory to explain foreign ownership and 
performance in a developing country.
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INTRODUCTION
Foreign ownerships are essential to the Malaysian economy 
since this type of ownership is significant in the capital 
market (Boo 2003). In early the stages of independence, 
foreign ownership was dominant in the Malaysian 
economy. Foreign equity ownership represented more 
than 60 per cent of Malaysian businesses in 1969. This 
figure had dramatically decreased but still maintained a 
significant figure of 28.8 per cent in 2004 and increased to 
37.9 per cent in 2008 (Zainal Abidin 2011). The statistics 
revealed the evidence of the development of Malaysian 
equity market which is heavily influenced by the National 
Economic Policy (NEP). Meanwhile, the Industrial 
Coordination Act (ICA) 1975 has liberalised the NEP to be 
more accommodative towards non-Bumiputra and foreign 
business communities (Heng 1997). Some foreign direct 
investors hold a majority of shares as part of strategic 
investment. Multinational firms also hold significant 
ownership in their subsidiaries listed on Bursa Malaysia 
(Mohd Abdullah & Ayoib 2013).
 According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986), large 
shareholders have the incentives and resources to monitor 
management’s decisions and reduce agency costs in firms 
with concentrated ownership. The large shareholders tend 
to exercise tight control and bear the monitoring cost since 
this relates to the risks and returns of their investments. 
In this type of firm, agency problems may exist between 
the controlling owners as insider owners and other 
stakeholders such as the minority shareholders. In such 
cases, corporate control by the minority shareholders tends 
to be weak due to their limited power in controlling the 
management as well as low accessibility to information. 
The recent report from the observance of standard and code 
of corporate governance (The World Bank 2005) stated 
that foreign-controlled companies in Malaysia paid a high 
portion of their profits in the form of dividends. Foreign 
institutional investors through their share ownership also 
provide capital, managerial expertise and monitoring effort 
on managers. Therefore, foreign ownership in emerging 
economies might improve firm performance and enhance 
efficiency. However, the extent to which they actively seek 
to monitor and engage management in order to improve 
firm performance has to be further empirically tested.
 The increment of foreign investors has become an 
important factor in influencing the economy, particularly 
in emerging markets as the demand for capital in these 
countries is increasing. In October 1999, Minister of 
Finance II, Mustapha Muhamad, and the Chairman of 
the Securities Commission (SC), Ali Abdul Kadir, jointly 
unveiled the Capital Market Masterplan Malaysia (CMMM). 
The purpose of this plan was to provide market participants 
with strategic clarity as far as the vision and objectives for 
the capital market are concerned. Regardless of the cyclical 
factors, many aspects of CMMM were implemented. In 
2004, the KLSE was demutualized, that is, it was converted 
to a corporate legal entity under the name Bursa Malaysia 
and listed on the very exchange that it operated. New stock 
broking licences were also issued and foreign investment 
restrictions relaxed, culminating in the decision to allow 
majority ownership for fund managers and stock broking 
houses.
 In 2005, five foreign financial institutions were 
awarded licences to operate. These included Credit Suisse, 
J.P. Morgan, Macquarie Securities, USB AG and CLSA 
Asian-Pacific Markets. All of these companies could offer 
institutional services but were restricted from catering to 
50 
individuals or the retail end of the market. In addition, one 
fund management firm, Aberdeen Assets Management, was 
awarded a licence to operate. Therefore, equity market 
policies after 2005 have favoured greater openness and 
globalization. Foreign investors have a strong influence on 
emerging equity markets due to globalization around the 
world. This pattern is expected to continue in the future. 
Foreign ownership can affect firm performance either 
via direct intervention or indirect supply-demand effects. 
Foreign investors exert a significant influence due to their 
large presence in the markets, particularly as they hold 
more shares compared to the local investors. Boo (2003) 
stated that some markets are now facing difficulties in 
attracting foreign investors unless the companies start 
to pay more attention towards the corporate governance. 
Mitton (2002) suggested that during the East Asian 
financial crisis, many focused companies as well as those 
with higher quality disclosure and more concentrated 
outside ownership had better performance. As a result, 
foreign ownership in emerging countries can improve 
corporate governance, enhance the efficiency and improve 
firm performance.
 Therefore, this study utilises the agency theory in the 
Malaysian capital market in order to explain the behaviour 
of foreign investors in monitoring and controlling firms’ 
activities in order to secure their investments. The results 
are likely to provide richer information with regard to the 
effects of country specific ownership characteristics with 
foreign equity ownership and corporate performance. As 
such, Malaysia as part of emerging economies with the 
aforementioned characteristics provides a good setting 
in studying the effect of foreign ownership on firm 
performance. This study investigated the effect of foreign 
ownership on firm performance in the Malaysian capital 
market. 
 This paper is arranged as follows. The next section 
discusses the past research and formulation of hypotheses. 
The section is followed by research method. Section four 
is the analysis and discussion; followed by Section five, 
the conclusion of the study.
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND COMPANIES’ PERFORMANCE
Many companies in Malaysia have significant foreign 
ownership due to financial liberalization (Mohd Abdullah 
& Ayoib 2013). Their shares of ownership ranged from 
low percentage held by institutional shareholders to large 
block holdings by multinationals in their subsidiaries. 
Foreign investors have greater international business 
experiences that enable them to effectively deal with cost 
and uncertainties in accepting equity partners (Hennart 
1991, Padmanabhan & Cho 1996, Jiang & Yamada 2011).
Two explanations are generally offered for the behaviour 
of foreign ownership. Firstly, they select companies in 
which they have better information. Larger and well 
established companies would have less information 
asymmetry and are generally favoured by foreign 
investors (Dahlquist & Robertson 2001). Secondly, large 
foreign multinational ownership may also have real 
impact on the management and government practices of 
local public listed subsidiaries and associates. Companies 
with foreign equity ownership are endowed with superior 
technical, managerial expertise as well as organizational 
and financial resources. According to Globerman, Ries, 
and Vertinsky (1994), the performances of foreign owned 
firms are superior due to the possession of firm specific 
advantages. One of the main reasons is that tangible and 
intangible assets are profitably deployed abroad after 
being developed domestically and the transaction costs 
associated with managing single organization across 
countries are lower than the transaction costs of multiple 
organizations with different owners. 
 Previous studies in the emerging and developing 
economies by Chibber and Majumdar (1999) in India 
and Wiwattanakantang (2001) in Thailand found that 
foreign ownership companies showed better performance 
compared to other types of ownership. The agency theory 
was utilized to explain the relationship between foreign 
ownership and firm performance. The findings of this study 
showed that firm performance has positive relationship 
with foreign ownership. These are consistent with the 
predictions of the standard industrial organization theory 
of foreign investment (Hill 2000). This theory is proposed 
within a given country and industry context firms in which 
a higher share of foreign ownership on average has a better 
performance than their domestic counterparts (Boardman, 
Shapiro & Vining 1997). According to Demsetz and Leh 
(1985), foreign ownership with significant control allows 
the monitoring of activities and reduction in agency costs. 
In addition, foreign owners tend to be long-term investors 
and most of the time they are single block shareholders 
(Douma, George & Kabir 2002). Hence, these advantages 
provided them with the capabilities and strong incentives 
to monitor the firms they invested in.
 Further, Djankov and Hoekman (2000) found foreign 
investment’s association with the provision for generic 
knowledge (management skill and quality systems) and 
specific knowledge (which cannot be transferred at arm’s 
length). Generally, management and governance policies 
are applied uniformly globally; and subsidiaries of foreign 
multinational generally have access to managerial talent 
and skill from the home base that can effectively be 
deployed to improve firm performance. Another study by 
Cook and Jeon (2006) found that high foreign ownership 
is associated with great performance in Korea. Thus, they 
concluded that foreign ownership plays a prominent role 
in firm financial policy in emerging market. 
 According to Sankar and Sankar (2000) the ability in 
capital, labour and technology provide foreign investor the 
better position to exploit the advantages to influence firm 
performance positively. Further, Lee et al. (2006) found 
the evidence that foreign ownership responds significantly 
to performance. Consistent with the agency theory, foreign 
investors with substantial share can play their monitoring 
role on management and reduce the agency cost. As a 
result, the firm’s performance will increase (Easterbrook 
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1984; Jensen 1986; Jiang & Yamada 2011). This study 
states the following hypothesis:
H1: There is positive relationship between foreign 
ownership and firm performance.
METHODOLOGY
Data of this study were collected from secondary sources. 
Accounting information was collected from Osiris 
database. Ownership data were collected from the list of 
thirty largest shareholders in annual report, downloaded 
from Bursa Malaysia website. After considering the 
incomplete information, 730 usable samples covering three 
periods from the 2007 to 2009 were utilized. However, 
companies classified under the finance sector were 
excluded from this study because of their unique features 
and business activities, as well as differences in compliance 
and regulatory requirement. Normality check of the data 
was also carried out and some of the measures were 
transformed into logarithm to control for skewed nature 
of data. As multivariate regression was used to analyze 
the data in this study, assumptions of multicollinearity, 
hemoscedasticity and linearity were also tested. The 
econometric model developed utilized ROA and Tobin’s 
Q as performance indicator. The equation is tested in the 
current paper and is formally presented below:
PERFORMit = α0 + β1LFOREit + β2LSIZEit +
  β3GROWit + β4LEVit + β5LPROit  
  + β6AGEit + β7PRit + β8IPit +   
  β9CPit +  β10CONit + β11TRADit  
  + εit
Notes:
PERFORM Firm performance represented by ROA or 
Tobin’s Q
ROA Return on Asset of firm
α0 Intercept/constant term.
LFORE Log of foreign ownership
LSIZE Log size (log of total assets)
GROW Growth
LEV Leverage
LPRO Log of profitability
AGE Firm age
PR Properties (1 for the firm operated in PR 
sector, otherwise 0)
IP Industrial Product (1 for the firm operated in 
IP sector, otherwise 0)
CP Consumer Products (1 for the firm operated 
in CP sector, otherwise 0)
CON Construction (1 for the firm operated in CON 
sector, otherwise 0)
TRAD Trading and services (1 for the firm operated 
in TRAD sector, otherwise 0)
ε Error term
i ith firm
t ith period
FINDINGS
The results of data stationary normality test using 
data mean, medium, standard deviation, skewness and 
kurtosis are shown in Table 1. According to Tabachnick 
and Fidell (2001), to use of the analysis of variance for 
the population or samples of observation is assumed 
to be normally distributed and it is important where to 
conduct parametric statistical techniques. The population 
or sample is assumed normally distributed when mean of 
variables similar to value of medium, skewness value is 
zero and kurtosis value equal to 3. Skewness and kurtosis 
are two components in determining normality (Pallant, 
2005). The diagnostic test showed that no variable had the 
value of mean equal to value of median. In addition, the 
skewness values of variables were mixed both positively 
and negatively, indicating that their distributions skewed 
to the right as well as to the left of the curve. Sample is 
assumed to be normally distributed if skewness value is 
zero. The kurtosis value of variables showed no variable 
with a value of 3. Therefore, it indicated that the result 
violated the assumption of normally distribution.
TABLE 1. Results of normality test
ROA TQ LFORE LSIZE GRW LEV LPRO AGE
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev
Skewness
Kurtosis
0.064
0.060
11.08
-21.94
0.698
-15.280
578.334
0.617
0.330
38.000
-1.350
1.638
12.668
233.686
0.269
0.000
2.600
-3.000
0.704
-0.732
6.805
5.531
5.480
7.850
0.780
0.661
-0.324
7.998
1.422
0.710
14.900
0.010
1.940
3.014
13.876
0.188
0.060
16.174
-0.062
0.877
13.292
203.880
4.239
4.192
6.962
1.041
0.782
-0.022
3.868
15.396
13.000
50.000
0.000
11.242
1.312
3.984
SKtest
Probability
4378.97
0.00*
3932.55
0.00*
357.52
0.00*
284.39
0.00*
1413.49
0.00*
3992.05
0.00*
28.27
0.00*
428.90
0.00* 
Notes:
The * denotes p-value significance at 1 percent level (p<0.01).
ROA = Return on Assets, TQ = Tobin’s Q ratio, LFORE = Log foreign ownership, 
LSIZE = Log total assets, GRW = Market value of share divided by book value of share, LEV = Total debt divided by total assets, LPRO = Log profit or loss, 
AGE = Year of listing.
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 Utilizing SK test to evaluate the normality for all 
variables showed that it was significant at 1 percent (p<0.01); 
and this means that all the variables had failed to fulfil the 
normality assumption. Since the data distribution was not 
normally distributed, the estimation method of ordinary least 
square (OLS) to analyse the sample data would produce bias 
and inefficient estimators. Therefore, the generalized least 
square (GLS) method of estimation is more appropriate and it 
is expected to yield a much better result (Gujarati 2003). The 
issue which involves the variables of non-normal distribution 
is quite common in research involving large sample size 
(Pallant 2005). In fact, this argument is agreed by Norusis 
(2000) and Kleinbaum, Kupper, Muller, and Nizam (1998) 
whereby variance analysis is not heavily dependent on the 
assumption of normality since the data is large. As a result, 
the assumption of normality is not seriously offended since 
this study covered a large sample size.
 This study needs to ensure that the data must be 
independent of one another. This means, observations or 
independent variables must not be influenced by other 
independent variables (Pallant 2005). According to Steven 
(1996), it is a very serious matter if this assumption is 
violated. He added that each study must ensure that all 
observations are independent. This study was based on 
Pair-wise Pearson correlation matrix for the variables and 
the results are provided in Table 2.
 The analysis starts with the report of the regression 
using generalized least square (GLS) estimations technique 
on ROA and Tobin’s Q. The F-statistic for both ROA and 
Tobin’s Q models were statistically significant at 1% level. 
The R² indicated values of 0.18 and 0.29 respectively. The 
adjusted R² were 0.17 and 0.28 respectively. The regression 
analyses using GLS estimation technique are reported in 
Table 3. 
 The regression results reported in Table 3 suggest 
that foreign ownership has a positive relationship with 
firm performance and statistically significant at 1 percent 
(p<0.01). The coefficient of foreign ownership 0.113 shows 
that one percent increase in foreign ownership leads to 
0.113 percent in ROA. This finding supports hypothesis 
H1 that higher concentrated foreign ownership companies 
exhibit higher firm performance; and this is consistent with 
finding by Cook and Jeon (2006), Lee et al. (2006) and 
Jiang and Yamada 2011). 
 Foreign ownership shows a positive and significant 
relationship with Tobin’s Q at 1 percent (p<0.01). One 
percent increase in foreign ownership leads to 0.125 
percent in Tobin’s Q. This finding supports the hypothesis 
H2 that the higher concentrated foreign ownership, the 
higher firm performance. The finding is also consistent 
with the study done by Cook and Jeon (2006) and Lee et 
al. (2006). The result showed that foreign investors with 
substantial equity ownership play their monitoring role on 
management and reduce agency cost.
 According to Djankov and Hoekman (2000), the 
performances of foreign owned firms are superior to other 
types of ownership due to firm specific advantages. One 
of the main reasons is that tangible and intangible assets 
are profitably deployed abroad after being developed 
domestically and transaction costs associated with 
managing single organization across countries are lower 
than the transaction costs of multiple organizations with 
different owners. 
 The findings of this study showed that firm performance 
has positive relationship with foreign ownership. Hence, 
these advantages provide them the capabilities and 
strong incentives to monitor the firms they invested in. 
Foreign ownership firms may have the access to technical 
capabilities, financial resources and superior managerial 
capital. This suggests that foreign ownership firms are 
efficient, taking advantage of their advanced technology 
compared to other types of ownership.
 The efficient monitoring by foreign investors is 
possible for a number of reasons. The first one is an 
increase in information symmetry due to reduction in 
the problems of hidden actions, adverse selection and 
invisibility of managerial actions (Chhibber & Majumdar 
1999). The second is the increasing economies of scale 
through acquiring and utilizing information (Dahlquist & 
Robertson 2001).
TABLE 2. Result of multicollinearity test using Pearson Correlation matrix
ROA TQ LFORE LSIZE GRW LEV LPRO AGE
ROA 1.000
TQ 0.232* 1.000
LFORE -0.175* -0.358* 1.000
LSIZE -0.021 0.365* -0.274* 1.000
GRW 0.187* 0.774* -0.366* 0.460* 1.000
LEV 0.255* 0.003 -0.023 -0.107* 0.003 1.000
LPRO 0.242* 0.463* -0.297* 0.657* 0.547* 0.025 1.000
AGE 0.015 0.263* -0.277* 0.322* 0.273* 0.020 0.255* 1.000 
Notes: 
The * and ** indicate correlation are significant at the 0.01 (2-tailed) and 0.005 (2-tailed) levels, respectively.
ROA=Return on Assets, TQ = Tobin’s Q Ratio, LFORE = Log foreign ownership, LSIZE = Log total assets, GRW = Market value of share divided by book value 
of share, LEV = Total debt divided by total assets, LPRO = log profitability, AGE = Year of listing.
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CONCLUSION
The findings of foreign ownership matters in the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance are important and interesting. This study has 
demonstrated that there is a positive relationship between 
foreign ownership and firm performance based on ROA 
and Tobin’s Q. The findings supported the conjecture that 
foreign ownership leads to superior firm performance of 
public listed companies in Malaysia. As a conclusion, 
foreign ownership firms have a better performance due 
to their specificity that leads to reduced agency costs and 
enhanced firm performance. 
 Thus, this study fills the gap in an empirical knowledge 
of foreign ownership and performance relationship. Most 
of the ownership and performance studies are conducted 
in developed countries. This study adds knowledge to the 
literature in Malaysia, one of the developing countries. 
It contributes to the existing ownership and performance 
literature by providing evidence regarding foreign 
ownership factor associated with firm performance. This 
study has several important theoretical implications to 
the finance and accounting literature in explaining the 
ownership and performance relationship. This relationship 
has not been previously examined in other past studies 
using the perspective offered by this study. This study offers 
insights to policy makers interested in enhancing the capital 
market in Malaysia. First, the results of this study suggest 
that the impact of foreign ownership in the private sector as 
suggested by the NEP showed some good results. It is also 
implicitly suggests that the Malaysian government needs 
to review and modify more effective approaches especially 
in relation to the firm’s ownership distribution that builds 
the capacity of the economy to face intense competition 
especially from regional and emerging economies. Second, 
in the future, when the business environment is becoming 
more rugged, the Malaysian government will have much 
less room for bargaining with potential foreign investors. 
The massive outflow of domestic capital and the lower 
FDI inflows may put the NEP in the spotlight. As the world 
becomes more integrated through globalization, there are 
calls for the NEP methods to be reviewed so that the private 
sector can deliver a higher growth while meeting the larger 
restructuring objectives. 
 The present study has several limitations that may 
potentially influence the interpretation of the results. These 
limitations should be considered when interpreting the 
results or when applying the method of this study in other 
research settings. First, this study used Malaysian data. As 
such, care should be taken in generalizing the results to 
others countries because of different regulations, practices 
and economic factors. The Malaysian capital market differs 
from the international markets in terms of size, number of 
listed firms, and market valuation. However, the findings 
and policy implications of the study can be extended 
to other economies where there are similar ownership 
characteristics. Second, this study attempted to collect 
data from the annual reports based on the availability of 
the firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia. These include the 
main board, second board, MESDAQ market for 2007 and 
2008, and extended to the Main Market and ACE market for 
2009. The sample is not representative of all listed firms 
TABLE 3. Regression for GLS estimation
Independent variables ROA Tobin’s Q
Constant
LFORE
1.015
0.113*
0.160
0.036
1.724
0.125*
0.424
0.043
Control variables
LSIZE
GROW
LEV
LPRO
AGE
PR
IP
CP
CON
TRAD
-0.288*
0.008
0.089***
0.165***
0.001**
-0.062
-0.075
-0.017
0.041
-0.544
0.021
0.006
0.010
0.017
0.001
0.117
0.114
0.116
0.113
0.114
-0.429*
0.181*
0.342*
0.151*
0.001
0.198
0.177
0.288
0.313
0.513**
0.054
0.016
0.025
0.045
0.002
0.313
0.306
0.311
0.301
0.307
F-statistics 366.85* 623.83*
R² 0.18 0.29
Adjusted R² 0.17 0.28
Durbin-Watson stat Na 1.512
Baltagi-Wu LBI (Locally best in variance) Na 2.390 
Notes:
The * indicates significant at 1 percent (p<0.01), ** indicates at 5 percent (p<0.05) and *** indicates at 10 percents (p<0.1).
LFORE = log foreign ownership, LSIZE = Log total assets, GRW = market value of share divided by book value of share, LEV = total 
debt divided by total assets, LPRO = log profitability, AGE = year of listing, LIQ = total current assets divided by total current liability.
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in Malaysia, thus introducing a size bias. Given the size of 
the final sample, namely 730 listed companies, selection 
bias caused by the availability of annual reports or financial 
variables data should not threaten the results of the study. 
In order to improve the generalization of the results, future 
studies can be expanded to bigger samples. Nevertheless, 
the above limitations highlight rooms for improvement in 
future research in ownership and performance relationship 
and do not underestimate the value of this research. 
As long as this research follows a rigorous process and 
achieves its objectives, the usefulness of this research is 
not questionable. 
 This study has a number of areas to be explored for 
future research. First, this study was not conducted to 
account for the endogeneity issue; thus, future research could 
address this issue further. In order to avoid endogeneity and 
unobservable heterogeneity using panel data methodology, 
the generalized method of moment (GMM) estimation 
method can be utilized. This method allows the researchers 
to control the problems of endogeneity by using instruments. 
Second, in Malaysia, further investigation should be done 
as to find out other types of ownership such as family-
owned companies and their effects on firm performance. 
In addition, the theoretical models on the link between 
ownership structure, firm performance and investment 
decision are still sparse. Therefore, subsequent studies 
should concentrate on examining the links of ownership 
structures, firm performance and the underinvestment and 
overinvestment on firm valuation.
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